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The Florida Keys Hurricane House:
Post-Disaster New Deal Housing
by Matthew G. Hyland

H

urricanes make history in Florida, and scholars often pursue
Florida's violent weather to trace the state's development
in relation to storms and, afterward, recovery. Since
the colonial period, hurricanes have demonstrated their power
to damage the region's economy by destroying property, lives,
settlements, and cities. One storm in particular, the 1935 Labor Day
Hurricane, proved to be a furious and destructive event. Its death
toll was high-its destruction merciless. It stands as a landmark in
the history of the Florida Keys, but focusing on the storm's strength
and tragic drama obscures other relevant consequences. It also
made architectural history. This article, then, is a reflection on
homes built and rebuilt in 1935-1936 as the Upper Florida Keys
recovered from the hurricane-showing how the storm extended
the reach of New Deal programs to unprecedented levels in an
effort to save a traumatized community.
In the hurricane's immediate aftermath, when feelings of
anguish and desperation ran high, the federal government, with
initial assistance from the American Red Cross, repaired and built
private homes in Tavernier and Islamorada, Monroe County. These
modest homes, quite different in character from better-known,
large-scale housing projects of the New Deal, challenged traditional
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assumptions regarding capitalistic economic relations in the
construction industry and private home ownership, a hallmark of
the American dream, and brought the federal government further
into the housing market. As a consequence of the storm and the
Great Depression, the Hurricane Houses of the Upper Keys mark
an enduring New Deal legacy.
Shifting attention to private houses built in Islamorada and
Tavernier during the recovery broadens the significance of the
storm and shows a wider scope of New Deal economic and social
intervention into realms of entrenched American values. Typically,
inquiries into housing policy and construction projects of the New
Deal focus on community planning, municipal infrastructure, lowincome housing projects, and rural resettlement initiatives. Farm
cooperatives, slum clearance, and affordable rental units take
center stage in historical analyses of New Deal housing. 1
Previous investigations of the 1935 Labor Day Hurricane have
focused on human drama and nature's destructive capacity. In events
and decisions leading up to the storm's arrival at Islamorada, these
works look for someone to blame for over four hundred deaths and
find federal officials in charge of the work camps underestimating
the breadth and power of Florida hurricanes. They focus on the limits
of early twentieth-century weather forecasting and note imprecise
wording in the warnings. They lament that, in order to determine
the location and strength of the storm, weather forecasters in 1935
relied on reports from ship captains, who were navigating away from
the storm, and far flung monitoring stations. Historians criticize the
inadequacies of the weather bureau in addition to the delays and

1.

For relevant ew Deal historiography, see Sidney Johnston, Florida's New Deal
Resources, National Register of Historic Places Multiple Property Documentation Form
(Washington, D.C.: ational Park Service, 2004); Gwendolyn Wright, Building
the Dream: A Social History ofHousing in America (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
1983); John A. Stuart and John F. Stack, Jr., eds. The New Deal in South Florida:
Design, Policy, and Community Building, 1933-1940 (Gainesville: University Press
of Florida, 2008); Joseph L. Arnold, The New Deal in the Suburbs: A History of
the Greenbelt Town Program, 1935-1954 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,
1971); Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-1940 (New
York: Hill & Wang, 1989); Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal
Community Program (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1959) ; Michael W.
Straus and Talbot Wegg, Housing Comes of Age (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1938); C.W. Short and R. Stanley-Brown, Public Buildings: A Survey of
Architecture of Projects Constructed by Federal and other Governmental Bodies Between
the Years 1933 and 1939 with the Assistance of the Public Works Administration
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1939).
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inexperience of camp administrators who neglected to evacuate
veterans well in advance of the hurricane. They target the last
minute call for the railroad rescue train that arrived in Islamorada
too late. Most histories of the storm end with the closing of official
investigations in 1936. The houses built during the recovery gamer
brief mention only, with no mention made offederal funds devoted
to private housing. 2
By examining this instance of federally funded and designed
private home building following the hurricane in the Upper Florida
Keys, two important developments become evident: the emergence
of a distinctive type of Florida architecture (the Hurricane House)
that influenced later designs for homes and storm shelters on the
Keys and, consequently, an enlarged federal role in Monroe County
during the Depression. After the hurricane, the federal government
and the Red Cross combined their revitalization efforts in the
keys. As a response to the emergency, they introduced examples
of vernacular architecture that have much to tell about rebuilding
community and modern construction techniques adapted to the
imperatives of building and living in a hurricane environment.
Compared to prominent New Deal work projects in Florida
that ranged from numerous schools, courthouses, community
centers, the low-income public housing units known as Durkeeville
inJacksonville and Liberty Square in Miami, and the resettlement
community at Cherry Lake Farms to Miami's Municipal Stadium
(the "Orange Bowl"), the National Guard Armory in Tallahassee,
bridges, highways, harbor improvements at Miami, the state hospital
in Chattahoochee, and the hospital building of the state prison in
Raiford, these Hurricane Houses appear as modest achievements. 3
However, the federal government's direct involvement in building

2.

3.

Willie Drye, Storm of the Century: The Labor Day Hurricane of 1935 (Washington,
D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2002); Thomas Neil Knowles, Category 5:
The 1935 Labor Day Hurricane (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009),
301, 305; Phil Scott, Hemingway's Hurricane: The Great Florida Keys Storm of 1935
(Camden, ME: International Marine/McGraw-Hill, 2006);Jay Barnes, Florida's
Hurricane History (Chapel Hill: University of orth Carolina Press, 1998).
Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, 137, 140, 192; Michael W. Straus and
Talbot Wegg, Housing Comes of Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938),
207, 211-212; C.W. Short and R. Stanley-Brown, Public Buildings, 94, 169, 218219, 330, 377, 378-379, 422, 558-560, 665.
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private houses, not just funding such schemes as mortgage
insurance, slum clearance in cities, or renovation of dilapidated
houses in Key West, widens the Hurricane Houses' significance in
studies of the New Deal in Florida and distinguishes the homes
from other federal efforts in rebuilding community. As owneroccupied, single-family dwellings, Hurricane Houses have been
overlooked as examples of New Deal projects in South Florida,
overshadowed by the Overseas Highway, Liberty Square, and other
municipal improvement projects.
Red Cross's initial command of the project has introduced
a historical elision regarding the federal government's strong
presence in the middle and final stages of rebuilding Islamorada.
Unlike Miami's Liberty Square project, the Hurricane Houses
emerged without opposition or controversy. The storm naturalized
the need for them. Liberty Square, which provoked protests
from Miami's white community, created segregated AfricanAmerican public housing rental units built by white architects and
contractors supervising black laborers. 4 Islamorada's Hurricane
Houses, which received no complaints from community members
or critical editorials in the press during construction, were built
mainly by African-American laborers for white landowners with
public money. The lack of protest in Islamorada should not come
as a surprise. The Red Cross, it seemed, was running the project.
Federal agencies, for the moment, stepped back to let the Red Cross
serve as the lead agency. Newspaper accounts put the Red Cross on
the scene first, placing the disaster response in their hands from
the beginning. Additionally, the Red Cross recently had responded
to the Lake Okeechobee hurricane in a similar manner by building
and repairing homes in Belle Glade. Furthermore, Gwendolyn
Wright has shown that during the New Deal, the building and
construction industry expressed perfunctory disapproval over
federal governmental regulation of industry practices, quality of
materials, and lending rates. Yet, the industry was pleased to have

4.

John A. Stuart, "Liber
are: ty Squ
Florida's First Public Housing Project," in John
A. Stuart and John F. Stack,Jr., eds. The New Deal in South Florida: Design, Policy,
and Community Building, 1933-1940 (Gainesville: Unive rsity Press of Florida,
2008) ' 186-222.
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the federal government, through mortgage guarantees, take the
risk out of "investments in conventional residential construction." 5
Hurricane Houses offer new realizations of depression-era
governmental action and a seminal moment in the growth and
development of South Florida. They highlight developments in
local construction methods and portray a determination to establish
permanent community following an event, which, according to
some reports, completely obliterated Islamorada. Indeed, the storm
reduced the community to shambles. The federal government and
the Red Cross built the houses to provide a foundation for that
community's revitalization and identity.
Hurricane Houses, many of them still standing today, appeared
on the landscape during a time of local crisis and controversial
New Deal housing initiatives. The Federal Emergency Relief
Agency (FERA), established in 1933, and the American Red Cross
built the houses between late 1935 and 1936. The project's start
date placed the buildings after the 1934 creation of the Federal
Housing Administration, which insured private lending agencies
dealing mainly with middle-class families and mortgages, and
before the 1937 Wagner-Steagall Housing Act, which initiated
federally funded slum-clearance for state and municipal housing
agencies. This was a time when attitudes about federal public
housing initiatives lacked wide support. In this case, however,
painful memories of the storm and sympathy for survivors drove
the demand for immediate action. These houses, designed by a
FERA engineer, emerged as an anomaly among other New Deal
housing examples. They are not the product oflong-term planning
from a federal agency. They are not related to a federal mortgage
insurance agency. They have no connection to slum clearance
or low-income housing. They are not public housing. They are a
hybrid of emergency humanitarian relief, social concerns, work
relief, and modern economic stimulus. As such, the houses stand
as an example of expedient housing programs that emerged from
5.

For the remainder of the article, Red Cross/ Hurricane Houses will be termed
Hurricane Houses. In Islamorada, the houses go by various names: Works
Progress Administration (WPA) houses, hurricane houses, and Red Cross
houses. Using Hurricane House here emphasizes the origins of the house
type in the storm and through the federal recovery program, in addition to
its primary purpose of withstanding storms. Oddly, Hurricane Houses are
not discussed in Stuart and Stack, The New Deal in South Florida or Gwendolyn
Wright, Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) , 240.
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the Roosevelt administration during that experimental phase of
the New Deal focusing on programs devoted to economic recovery
after the banking crisis had been settled.
The project occurred during the Second New Deal. At
this time, the Roosevelt administration shifted its economic
recovery policy leftward, relying on deficit spending to fund
work programs that would boost consumer purchasing power.
By the end of 1935, the administration had phased out direct
relief initiatives that supported the first steps of Islamorada and
Tavernier toward recovery from the storm and reorganized federal
agency relief policies to provide work for employable people to
revive the economy. The federal restoration of Islamorada's built
environment proceeded through this transitional period. The
American Red Cross, a charity organization, began construction
of the houses as a humanitarian effort, only to have the federal
government intervene with direct relief funding after the immensity
of the project became apparent. After program restructuring, the
federal government completed the buildings as a work relief job.
Red Cross projects like Islamorada's Hurricane Houses no longer
received consideration after 1937 and federal officials, instead,
allocated funds to public work projects only.6
The State of Florida played no role in building the Hurricane
Houses. The state's relationship with the federal government at
this time lacked the effective cooperation maintained by the Red
Cross and FERA throughout the building project. While Governor
David Sholtz initially responded to the Labor Day Hurricane
sympathetically, the state's welfare officials lacked the funding and
mandate to assist in Islamorada's long-term recovery, let alone
support construction of the Hurricane Houses. Known as Florida's
New Deal governor, Sholtz, a Democrat, portrayed himself as a
political friend of President Roosevelt and a supporter of the New
Deal. He adopted the happy, can-do persona Roosevelt projected
to convey hope and confidence that the nation would survive the
depression. In practice, his administration did very little to rebuild
Islamorada. Indeed, Florida National Guardsmen participated in
the clean up of debris and bodies and distributed supplies, but that

6.

Edward Ainsworth Williams, Federal Aid for Relief (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1939) , 229, 240-241; Anthony]. Badger, The New Deal, 95-96,
109; Stuart and Stack, The New Deal in South Florida, 57; Short and StanleyBrown, Public Buildings, vi.
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was the limit of their involvement. As an example of Florida's lack
of commitment in aiding Islamorada's storm victims, the state sent
_the Red Cross a $3,115.15 bill for the use of state-owned equipment
and supplies during the clean-up after the Labor Day Hurricane. 7
Furthermore, Governor Sholtz presided over an administration
that lacked qualified employees who could distribute and manage
federally funded direct relief, particularly when FERA created new
rules that required qualified professionals to run the state 's relief
programs.8
Instead of adopting professional qualifications for social
workers state-wide, Florida officials battled federal social workers
for control over directing the state's welfare operation throughout
the Great Depression. Distribution of relief as patronage, increasing
executive power, and the qualifications of social workers provided
sources of conflict between the governor, board members, and
professional social workers from out of state who had been hired
to administer federally funded programs. State officials sought to
control federally funded relief from Tallahassee by hiring native
Floridians loyal to the gubernatorial administration. Federal
officials, noting Florida's inadequate social welfare bureaucracy,
complained that Florida was out of compliance with professional
social work standards. When Fred Cone succeeded Sholtz in office,
he also directed his administration on a course to regain control
of state welfare distribution from federal officials instead of raising
the qualifications of social workers in Florida. In general, according
to its critics, Florida state government did not pay its fair share of
relief to those on the welfare rolls and paid little attention to the
hardship in Islamorada. As a result, the federal presence in the
keys overwhelmed that of the state. 9
In their architectural design, the standardized forms of the
Hurricane Houses illustrate residual Progressive social concerns
for decent, sanitary, and safe housing but little concern for

7.

8.
9.

William B. Lovejoy, Red Cross Accountant, to Howard J. Simons, Director
of Disaster Relief, December 30, 1935, Records of the American National
Red Cross, 1935-1936, DR 655 Florida Hurricanes, Sept. 2-28, 1935, Weekly
Reports, Box 1235, National Archives and Records Administration, College
Park, Maryland.
Merlin G. Cox, "David Sholtz: New Deal Governor of Florida," Florida Historical
Quarterly 43, no. 2 (October 1964): 142-152.
David Nelson, "A New Deal for Welfare: Governor Fred Cone and the Florida
State Welfare Board," Florida Historical Quarterly 84, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 185-204.
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contemporary aesthetics. As was intended, materials of the
masonry examples (concrete and steel reinforcement bars) left
the houses with an industrial look. From a current architectural
point of view, they appear as humble examples of emerging
modernist architecture, as a result of their massing, roof profile,
and fenestration. Their fa<;ades feature a half-width front porch
that shares an affinity with the prominent front porches of the
bungalow style, so popular at the time. For cultural historians,
the buildings reveal patterns of federal intervention intended to
satisfy reform objectives of the New Deal. They are an engineer's
standardized modern answer to a moment of social upheaval. They
stand as a counterpoint to the homes of "ill-housed" Americans.
They echo certain sentiments in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
first inaugural address, in which he argued "the measure of the
restoration lies in the extent to which we apply social values more
noble than mere monetary profit." 10 As historical artifacts, they
prompt a memory not just of the disaster but also a moment in
time when American society adopted the characteristics of the
guarantor state.
The federal presence in the disaster's whole story, from prelude
to conclusion, is extensive and worth recounting. The storm gave
the project urgency and set it on a quick pace to completion. An
understanding of events leading up to and immediately following
the storm informs the decision by the federal government to take
the extraordinary step of investing in private home construction
and initiating a bureaucratic infringement on such entrenched
community values as private property and private enterprise.
Well before the storm came ashore, the federal government and
veterans' advocacy groups had moved the remaining out-of-work
and disgruntled Bonus Army Marchers, fresh from occupying the
Capitol grounds and Anacostia Flats, to the Keys. There they could
find work through a New Deal work relief program. They had
marched on Washington, D.C., during the Bonus protests, but the
U.S. Army, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur,
violently evicted them. After the hurricane, the federal government
investigated the disaster. The investigating committee found that no
one was to blame. Then, the federal government commemorated it
10.

B.D. Zevin, ed., Nothing to Fear: The Se/,ected Addresses ofFranklin Delano Rnosevelt,
1932-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946), 14; Williams, Federal Aid for Relief,
87.
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by funding a public sculpture installation, in addition to rebuilding
and restoring the local community infrastructure.
Considered in this light, post-disaster housing in Islamorada
-goes hand in hand with that impressive example of New Deal
engineering running the entire length of the keys-the Overseas
Highway, which federal officials described at the time as "one of
the most spectacular highways in existence." 11 Before and after the
1935 Labor Day Hurricane, Monroe County was awash with federal
spending. Federally funded county finances, a highway project, a
new sewer system project in Key West, numerous other public works
projects in Key West (for example, a sewing room and a courthouse
records survey), a veteran relief project, a public art installation,
a new library, and a new home construction project transformed
Monroe County into a New Deal community. According to a FERA
official in Key West in October 1935, "Monroe County and Key
West have a population of approximately 13,000 persons, of which
approximately 9,000 or 70 percent are now dependent upon our
organization for relief." 12 The storm and the federal government,
to an extent greater than Henry Flagler's railroad and the state
government of Florida, reshaped Islamorada into a modern
community.
During the Great Depression, Monroe County, and Key West
in particular, suffered along with the rest of Florida. Prior to the
stock market crash and the bust of the Florida land boom, Key West
had entered a period of decline. The decline became noticeable
following World War I, when the U.S. Navy reduced its presence
there. Additionally, cigar manufacturing had abandoned the city
for Tampa, and the bulk of the sponge fishing industry had moved
to Tarpon Springs. Construction of the Florida East Coast Railway's
Key West Extension facilitated the importation of cheap Cuban
produce, particularly pineapples, that cut into the profits of Monroe
County growers and shippers, including those at Islamorada.
During Prohibition, tourists bypassed Key West in favor of Cuba,
further isolating Islamorada. The port of Miami drew shipping away
from Key West. Consequently, immense municipal debt resulted in
11.
12.

Short and Stanley-Brown, Public Buildings, 558.
Memorandum from Malcolm]. Miller to Harry Hopkins, October 29, 1935,
Records of the Works Progress Administration, Federal Emergency Relief
Administration, Central Files, 1933-1936, "New General Subject" Series,
February 1935-1936, 006 Florida Hurricane, Entry 9, Box 7, National Archives
and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland.
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the FERA takeover of Key West's and Monroe County's finances in
July 1934. According to FERA director Harry Hopkins, the Keys
were "a broken market" and local officials appealed to the state
"for moral and financial aid." Then, Governor Sholtz requested
that FERA act immediately to rehabilitate the keys "from both a
moral and economic viewpoint." Federal administrators intended
to stimulate the local economy through tourism promotion. 13
Elsewhere in Florida, the Florida East Coast Railway Company
(FEC) and the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company entered
bankruptcy and began abandoning sections of right-of-way. The
hurricane only exacerbated the railroads' financial distress. To
reduce high unemployment numbers and revitalize the region,
the federal government funded a road-and-ferry improvements
project along State Route 4A, which Florida had constructed
from Miami to Key West in 1926. The project also sought to boost
tourism. New bridges would replace slow ferry service to shorten
travel time between Miami and Key West. These ferry crossings and
approach roads were located at No Name Key and between Grassy
Key and Lower Matecumbe Key. The federal government also saw
an opportunity in this project to provide work for unemployed and
unruly veterans. 14
In the Keys, veterans got jobs building the first bridge at an
existing ferry crossing betweenjewfish Key and Lower Matecumbe
Key. FERA established work camps on Lower Matecumbe Key
and on Windley Key, also the site of a quarry. Each of the camps
contained approximately 60 cabins. The lightly framed, 20 foot

13.

14.

Harry L. Hopkins, Administrator, to Hon. J.R. McCarl, November 13, 1935,
Records of the WPA, Federal Emergency Relief Administration, "State" Series,
March 1933-1936, Florida 400 Entry 10, Box 56; Durward Long, "Workers
on Relief, 1934-1938, in Key West," Tequesta (1968): 54; Alice Hopkins, "The
Development of the Overseas Highway," Tequesta (1986), 50; Garry Boulard,
'"State of Emergency': Key West in the Great Depression," Florida Historical
Quarterly67, no. 2(October1988): 168-183; Knowles, Category5, 29-30.
Charlton W. Tebeau, A History of Florida (Miami: University of Miami Press,
1971), 385-387; Jennifer T. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking
of America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001) , 7, 186-197;
Sidney Johnston, Florida's New Deal Resources, National Register of Historic
Places Multiple Property Documentation Form (Washington, D.C.: National
Park Service, 2004), E2, ElO, and E34; Barnes, Florida's Hurricane History ,
145; Jerry Wilkinson, "History of Plantation Key," "History of Windley Key,"
"History of Upper Matecumbe Key," "History of Lower Matecumbe Key," Keys
Historeum, Historical Preservation Society of the Upper Keys website, http: //
www.keyshistory.org (accessedjune 22, 2012).
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by 20 foot, camp buildings were described as temporary structures
and held four men each. The cabins' foundations were either piers
of wood driven into the coral rock or concrete blocks to which
the frames were bolted, or "spiked." The exterior of the cabins
featured wood sheathing halfway up from the foundation. The
exterior wood boards stopped mid-height and the elevation was
left open and screened around the entire building with wire mesh
for ventilation and insect control. Exterior boards surmounted
sashless windows in the cornice area and operable shutters
protected the apertures during rainstorms. Other buildings, such
as the mess hall, infirmary, barbershop, and office, featured similar
construction materials and larger dimensions. FERA also leased
a hotel on Windley Key for worker housing and an infirmary.
FERA administrative officers rented rooms in a hotel on Upper
Matecumbe Key. When road construction began in earnest in mid1935, there were 684 men enrolled. The large work force was not
on the job for long before the hurricane struck. The temporary
shelters constructed for their convenience did not withstand the
hurricane's winds and high water surge. 15
At the height of hurricane season, a tropical depression
developed north of the Turks Islands. The Weather Bureau, a federal
agency with offices throughout Florida, posted advisory bulletins
beginning on August 30, 1935, when the storm strengthened
over the Bahamas. Although the storm appeared to be trending
south of the Keys it quickly intensified and changed direction
northward. Observers noted the small diameter of its vortex and
the "phenomenal violence" of its winds. Estimates of wind speed
ranged from 150 to 200 miles per hour, with gusts exceeding 200
miles per hour by the time it reached Islamorada. 16
On September 2, as it became evident that the storm might
threaten the Upper Keys, FERA began to mobilize a rescue train
15.

United States, "Florida Hurricane Disaster," Hearings Before the Committee on World
War Witerans' Legislation, House of Representatives, Seventy-Fourth Congress, Second
Session, on H.R 9486, a Bill for the Relief of Widows, Children and Dependent Parents
of World War Witerans Who Died As the Result of the Florida Hurricane at Windley
Island and Matecumbe Keys, September 2, 1935 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1936), 173-174, 580; Barnes, Florida's Hurricane History, 145;
Federal Writers' Project, Florida: A Guide to the Southern-most State, American
Guide Series (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), 330-331.
16. Knowles, Category 5, 22-23; W.F. McDonald, "The Hurricane of August 31
to September 6, 1935," Monthly Weather Review 63, no. 10: 269-271; Barnes,
Florida's Hurricane History, 146-149; Drye, Storm of the Century, 311.
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from the mainland. A FERA official in Jacksonville and a FEC official
in Miami began discussing the time needed for an evacuation
train to travel to Islamorada. A Monday morning report placed
the storm's location within 200 miles of the Keys. In congressional
testimony, Ray W. Sheldon, a FERA work camp supervisor, said his
barometer reading at that time dropped dramatically: "It showed a
drop of .06 from 11:30, or approximately 11:30, until shortly after
1. That was alarming." Drop in barometric pressure indicated the
storm was closing in on the keys. He sensed that the time to request
the train had arrived. Sheldon's FEC contact told him the train
would arrive approximately at 5:30 p.m. At 7 p.m., however, the
train had not arrived, and the station at Islamorada "was starting to
blow down," according to Sheldon. 17
The train did not leave immediately. Loading the train in the
yards, a stopover at Homestead to re-arrange the position of the
engine and take on passengers, and then wind-blown debris on the
tracks further delayed its arrival in Islamorada. At about 8:30 p.m.,
rescue train and storm collided in Islamorada. Massive waves of water
inundated the Upper Keys, from Tavernier at the southern tip of Key
Largo, south to Plantation Key, Windley Key, Lower Matecumbe Key,
Upper Matecumbe Key, and Long Key-scouring the low islands of
soil and vegetation and washing buildings off their foundations. As
they emerged from their places of refuge, survivors noticed that the
storm had demolished the rescue train. The railroad bridge and
roadway over Snake Creek between Windley Key and Plantation Key
and much of the fill that supported the railroad grade on Windley
Key had been washed away. Upper Matecumbe Key and Windley Key
had been divided by a new channel of water. In the Upper Keys,
total mortality was estimated at 409, with 244 known dead and 165
missing, plus a $6 million damage estimate. About 150 homes were
completely destroyed, according to the Red Cross, and about 250
homes suffered structural damage. 18
17.
18.

"Florida Hurricane Disaster," Hearings Before the Committee on World War veterans'
Legislation, 131-156, 160, 172.
Barnes, Florida's Hurricane History, 147-149, 156, 159; Drye, Storm of the Century,
172, 178, 214; Knowles, Category 5, 168, 289-291; McDonald, "The Hurricane
of August 31 to September 6, 1935," 269-270; Red Cross Final Report Florida
Hurricane of 1935, on file in the Florida Collection, Helen Wadley Branch
Library, Islamorada, Florida; DeWitt Smith to James L. Fieser, September 15,
1935 Memorandum, "Nature and Extent of Disaster," Records of the American
National Red Cross, 1935-1936, DR655 Florida Hurricanes, Sept. 2-28, 1935, Box
1235, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland.
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Search and rescue efforts began immediately. The Red Cross,
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) workers, Florida National
Guardsmen, and the Coast Guard looked for survivors and
gathered up the dead. Accounts of bodies found in trees, in the
mangroves, under piles of driftwood, in the bay, and in other
places along the shoreline provided graphic evidence of the
effect that the wind and flying debris had on the victims. Bloated,
decapitated, dismembered, sand-blasted, weathered bodies made
identification difficult. 19 Sheldon described a scene of desolation
at the Islamorada depot. "The locomotive was the only thing which
stood upright. It just looked as if a giant broom had swept across
there. The cars, some were on this side, some were half way over,"
he said. 2°For public health reasons, officials cremated many of the
recovered bodies (approximately 250) on the bayside shoreline. 21 A
FERA field representative in Islamorada reported to Hopkins that
"the devastation of approximately fifty miles of the Florida Keys is
complete. Practically every building within that area was destroyed.
About forty miles of railroad was [sic] completely wrecked, and the
highway is seriously damaged, and the ferry service was destroyed,
resulting in cutting Key West off completely from the mainland. "22
Public outcry was immediate. Within days of the storm, Ernest
Hemingway, living at the time in Key West, wrote a passionate
essay meant to mourn and memorialize the storm victims and
bring additional national attention to the disaster. In Hemingway's
mind, inept federal government officials and thoughtless camp
supervisors, not the violent weather, killed the veterans. He vividly
described a gruesome scene in the Islamorada ferry slip:
The biggest bunch of the dead were [sic] in the tangled,
always green but now brown, mangroves behind the tank
19.

20.
21.
22.

"Hurricane's Dead Dug out of Debris," New York Times, September 6, 1935, l;
"Injured Recount Camp Gale Horror," New York Times, September 5, 1935, 3;
Barnes, Flmida's Hurricane History, 148-149; Federal Writers' Project, Florida: A
Guide to the Southern-most State, 330;Jerrell H. Shofner, "Roosevelt's 'Tree Army':
The Civilian Conservation Corps in Florida," Florida Historical Quarterly 65, no.
4 (April 1987) , 443; Red Cross Final Report Florida Hurricane ofl 935, on file
in the Florida Collection, Helen Wadley Branch Library, lslamorada, Florida;
Drye, Storm of the Century, 186.
"Florida Hurricane Disaster," Hearings Before the Committee on World War Veterans'
L egislation, 251.
Drye, Storm of the Century, 295.
Memorandum from Malcolm]. Miller to Harry Hopkins, October 29, 1935,
Records of the WPA, Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Central Files,
1933-1936, "New General Subject" Series, Entry 9, Box 7.
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cars and the water towers. They hung on there, in shelter,
until the wind and the rising water carried them away.
They didn't all let go at once but only when they could
hold on no longer. Then further on you found them high
in the trees where the water swept them. You found them
everywhere and in the sun all of them were beginning to
be too big for their blue jeans and jackets that they could
never fill when they were on the bum and hungry.
Hemingway directed his anger at the federal government and
bureaucrats for not taking proper care of men at the veterans'
camps. He wrote, "Who sent nearly a thousand war veterans, many
of them husky, hard-working and simply out of luck, but many of
them close to the border of pathological cases, to live in frame
shacks on the Florida Keys in hurricane months?" Hemingway's
characterization of the workers' housing as shacks dramatized
their inadequacy and may have motivated the Red Cross and FERA
to build more substantial concrete homes for survivors. 23
The high death toll shocked the nation, leading to outrage,
controversy, and numerous investigations. The New York Times
printed articles under such headlines as: ''Veterans' Camp Wrecked
by Storm, Witnesses Tell of Terror as Florida Keys Hurricane Swept
Victims Away, Family Dumped in Bay, Two Children Still Missing
at Tavernier, Boy Clings all Night to Railroad Track" and "Storm
Inquiry to Centre on Delay of ReliefTrain." 24 Governor Sholtz and
President Franklin D. Roosevelt were among the first to call for indepth investigations of the disaster. "Gross carelessness somewhere
was responsible for the tragedy," said Governor Sholtz to a New York
Times reporter. Aubrey W. Williams, an assistant administrator of
FERA, conducted an investigation that found no negligence on the
part of the agency. Florida's governor assigned the state's attorney,
G.A. Worley, to complete an independent investigation. Initial
results pointed at faulty weather reports and railroad delays to

23.

24.

Ernest Hemingway, "Who Murdered the Vets? A First Hand Report on the
Florida Hurricane," in H emingway and the M echanism of Fame: Statements, Public
Letters, Introductions, Forewords, Prefaces, Blurbs, Reviews, and Endorsements ed.
Matthew Joseph Broccoli and Judith S. Baughman (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 2006) , 46-48.
"Veterans' Camp Wrecked by Storm," New York Times, September 4, 1935, l ;
"Storm Inquiry to Centre on Delay of Relief Train," New York Times, September
6, 1935, 11.
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account for the high death toll. Later, the Florida governor backed
away from his earlier statement about "gross carelessness" to say, "I
am sure no one could be blamed. "25
Veterans' advocacy groups joined the chorus for assigning blame
and punishment. Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion
conducted separate investigations that faulted camp administrators
for poor decision-making as the storm approached. The Veterans
Bureau blamed the large loss of life on camp administrators who
delayed the call for the rescue train, abandoned the men, and
misinterpreted severe weather advisories. These reports challenged
official statements that characterized the disaster as a catastrophic
act of nature. 26 Despite official proclamations, continual criticism in
the press prompted Congress to hold hearings.
By March 1936, the House of Representatives commenced
an investigation. Worried that the investigation would create
political pitfalls for the reigning Democrats during an election
year, Democratic committee members endeavored to complete a
probe that would not embarrass FERA officials and the Roosevelt
administration. The committee chairman, John E. Rankin from
Mississippi, claimed, "What we want is to get the facts and find
out if anybody is to blame." One of his Republican antagonists,
Edith Nourse Rogers asked, "You do not want to punish anybody?"
"No," he replied, "I am not trying to punish, nor am I trying to
protect anybody, but we are trying to get the facts which are pretty
hard to get when it comes to a storm, either before or after the
storm." 27 Democrats emphasized natural causes as the reason for
"Hurricane's Dead Dug Out of Debris," New York Times, September 6, 1935, 1;
"Roosevelt Orders Disaster Inquiry," New York Times, September 6, 1935, 8; "3
Inquiries Start in Florida Deaths," New York Times, September 7, 1935,3; "Deaths
Put at 300 in Veteran Camps," New York Times, September 7, 1935, 3; "Cremations
begun in Key Gale Area," New York Times, September 8, 1935, 3.
26. "V.F.W. Office Asks Inquiry," New York Times, September 6, 1935, 9; "Deaths Put at
300 in Veteran Camps," New York Times, September 7, 1935, 3; "3 Inquiries Start
in Florida Deaths," New York Times, September 7, 1935, 3; "Link Bonus Issue to
Florida Deaths," New York Times, September 15, 1935, N6; "V.F.W. Plans to Act on
Hurricane Deaths," New York Times, September 16, 1935, 14; "Hurricane Inquiry
Asked by V.F.W.," New York Times, September 20, 1935, 11; "300 Storm Deaths
Called Needless," New York Times, October 13, 1935,N3; "Men in Key Camps
Called Deserted," New York Times, October 15, 1935, 26; Drye, Storm of the Century,
216, 219-220, 225, 235-48, 252-257, 275: Knowles, Category 5, 168, 296-298.
27. "New Bills Flood House on the Opening Day," New York Times,January 4, 1936,
9; "House for Inquiry into Keys Disaster," New York Times, March 26, 1936, 8;
"Florida Hurricane Disaster, " Hearings Before the Committee on World War Veterans'
Legis/,ation, 181.
25.
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the disaster. Republican committee members, however, attempted
to marshal evidence and draw out testimony in a way that would
hurt Democrats in the upcoming fall election. They hoped to
uncover negligence, or at least callousness similar to the heavyhanded eviction of Bonus Army marchers from Anacostia Flats,
which turned public opinion against the Hoover administration,
hobbled the President's popularity, and lowered his 1936 reelection chances. Sniping between Rogers and Rankin continued
throughout the course of the hearings. One exchange with a
witness referenced treatment of the Bonus Army marchers:
Mrs. ROGERS. No; I said strain or stress. I am speaking of
such things as storms. Of course, they do have storms in
Florida. For instance, if you go to a travel agency, if you
intend to take a trip, during those hurricane months they
advise you to take your trip in some other month. So we
know that that situation exists.
[Rankin] The CHAIRMAN. Those men would have
preferred that to being driven out of Washington at the
point of the bayonet and having their tents burned down,
would they not, Mr. Williams.
Mr. WILLIAMS. If these mean anything to the record, we
had many more requests ...
[Rankin] The CHAIRMAN. You understand this, Mr.
Williams. I know that your administration did not have
anything to do with that, but I do know that a former
administration drove these same men out of Washington
at the point of a bayonet, when they were looking for work.
If you want the facts in the record, those are facts. 28
Although they claimed to be conducting a fair and impartial
probe, Democratic committee leaders overlooked evidence of
poor administration at the camps (insufficient sanitation, chronic
drunkenness, and labor strikes plagued the program from its start)
and attributed the disaster to uncontrollable and unforeseen
forces of nature-an act of God. At the close of the investigation,
the committee exonerated FERA officials, found no one negligent,

28.

"Florida Hurricane Disaster," Hearings Before the Committee on World War Veterans '
Legislation, 442.
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and concluded that nature, the unpredictable hurricane itself,
carried away those many lives at Islamorada. Lastly, it recommended
approval of a bill to compensate widows and orphans of those who
-died in the hurricane. Rogers continued to voice her dissent from
the official conclusion. 29
Congress did not have the last word on the 1935 Labor Day
Hurricane. Portrayed as a never-before-seen and immensely
powerful storm in the press, the hurricane left a lasting perception
of untrammeled destructiveness in the public mind. Thanks to
Hemingway's visceral response, sensational news reports, and
moving Congressional testimony, the event resonated in the national
consciousness, leaving the tragedy as fertile ground for popular
culture. When the film industry explored the hurricane in 1948,
the silver screen affirmed the storm's landmark status. Key Largo,
originally a stage play but completely rewritten into a screenplay,
exploited the 1935 Labor Day Hurricane for plot development. Set
in the years immediately following World War II, the film featured
Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall. Mid-way through the story,
a powerful hurricane begins to rattle the nerves of a cold-blooded,
murderous mobster named Rocco, played by Edward G. Robinson.
Rocco and his gang, staying at a Key Largo hotel, fear the intensifying
storm and ask the hotel's owner, Mr. Temple, how bad can storms
get in the Keys? Before Mr. Temple begins his answer, Rocco and
the gang members grow increasingly afraid of the foul weather,
acting nervous and agitated due to the howling winds and slamming
shutters. Mr. Temple, played by Lionel Barrymore, heightens their
fears by telling the tragic story of the 1935 Labor Day Hurricane:
Mr. Temple: "Well, the worst storm we ever had was back
in 1935. Wind whipped up a big wave and sent it bustin'
right over Matecumbe Key. Eight hundred people washed
out to sea."
Rocco: "How far away was that from here?"
Mr. Temple: "Eh, two miles."
Rocco yelling: "I don't believe it. Eight hundred guys
getting washed out to sea. You ' re a liar. Nobody would live
here after a thing like that happened. Would they Curly?"
29. Ibid., 31, 586-588; Drye, Storm of the Century, 258-288: Knowles, Category 5, 168,
301-302.
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Curly: "I remember reading about it in the papers at the
time."
Mr. Temple: "A relief train was dispatched from Miami.
The barometer was down to about 26 inches when the
train pulled into Homestead. The engineer backed his
train of empty coaches into the danger zone, and the
hurricane hit, knocked those coaches right off the track.
Two hundred miles an hour that wind blew. A tidal wave
twelve feet high went right across the key. Whole towns
were wiped out. Miles and miles of track were ripped up
and washed away. Nothin' was left. More than five hundred
bodies were recovered after the storm, and for months
afterwards corpses were found in the mangrove swamps." 30
The gangsters panic and make rash decisions that lead to their
demise. At the end of the movie, the characters played by Bogart,
the hero and a veteran, and Bacall, daughter of the hotel owner,
plan to start a new life together in Key Largo instead of leaving.
Undaunted by the power of hurricanes or the threats of gangsters,
they resolve to stay in the keys, echoing themes of recovery and
community re-building created by the federal government and the
Red Cross. More than a decade had passed between Labor Day
1935 and the release of Key Largo. In that time, the hurricane had
entered the nation's consciousness, with the film marking the
hurricane's prominence in public memory.
The film immortalized the hurricane, but the commemoration
process began immediately after Labor Day 1935. Veterans
demanded a memorial in late September 1935. 31 In March 1936,
the federal government authorized funding for a monument
dedicated to all of the storm's victims. Designed by sculptor Joan
van Breeman, installation began in July 1937. Funding came from
the Federal Arts Project of the Works Progress Administration
(WPA). The monument featured a crypt for cremated remains of
the storm's victims, with room to accommodate additional bodies;
some remains appeared years after the storm passed. As late as
January 1937, workers found seven skeletons of storm victims in

30.
31.

Key Largo, directed by John Huston, Warner Brothers, [1948] 2005.
Lilburn R. Railey, Chairman Dade County Chapter, Red Cross, to Colonel
George E. Ijams, Veterans' Bureau, September 27, 1935, Records of the
American National Red Cross, DR 655.6 Veterans folder, Box 1235.
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mangroves on Lower Matecumbe Key. The memorial dedication
occurred on November 14, 1937, at the close of hurricane season.
'.!'he WPA Symphony Orchestra performed at the ceremony.
A newspaper article announcing the dedication repeated the
impression of total catastrophe when it noted that the "dedication
will be held at Matecumbe, where an entire population was
destroyed." The monument reaffirmed the thorough federalization
of Monroe County, from road-building, new sewers in Key West,
and municipal financial assistance to house construction and
public art installation. 32
The hurricane also destroyed railroad service in the Florida
Keys. Already experiencing financial distress during the Depression,
FEC officials decided not to rebuild the Key West Extension due
to massive repair costs. Instead, the FEC sold the right-of-way and
bridges of the Key West Extension to the State of Florida in 1936.
Two years later, the Monroe County Toll Bridge Commission,
reliant on federal funding and labor, constructed a highway along
the former railroad right-of-way. Project advocates claimed it would
boost tourism, the only remaining industry in the keys at the time,
and help the community regain economic vitality. Increasing
tourism, the same rationale that brought veterans to work camps
at Islamorada, had been advocated as the best way to stimulate
business throughout Monroe County. The highway project was
one of the most extensive undertakings of the Public Works
Administration. Construction of the roadway totaled $3,527,329 in
federal financing and resulted in the completion of the Seven-Mile
Bridge: a roadway /bridge mounted on existing steel truss railroad
trestles, which workers widened to accommodate the travel lanes. 33
The storm left in its wake death, destruction, misery,
investigations, controversy, a monument, a film, and a new highway
between Key West and the mainland. It nearly wiped Islamorada
32.

"House for Inquiry into Keys Disaster," New York Times, March 26, 1936, 8; "Keys
Memorial to be Unveiled," New York Times, October 17, 1937, 195; "1935 Gale
Victims Found," New York Times,January 24, 1937, 78; Federal Writers' Project,
Florida: A Guide to the Southern-most State, 161; Johnston, Rorida's New Deal
Resources, E68-69; A Program of the Ceremonies at the Dedication of the Florida Keys
Memorial, Upper Matecumbe, Florida, November 14, 193 7, Records of the American
National Red Cross, DR 655.6 Veterans Folder, Box 1235.
33. Johnston, Florida's New Deal Resources, E32, 34; Alice Hopkins, "The
Development of the Overseas Highway," Tequesta (1986), 51-55; Short and
Stanley-Brown, Public Buildings, 559; Federal Writers' Project, Florida: A Guide
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as a community off the map. In the days following the disaster,
Islamorada appeared as a wasteland. The railroad, a symbol of
modernity and progress through heavy industry, had become a
crumpled knot of twisted rails and ties. Arable land, mainly lime
groves and gardens, had been washed into the sea. A Red Cross
volunteer reported, "No property was left standing except two
small houses, and two or three outbuildings. Destruction was
complete. At every turn, one smelled death. On the lower end
of Lower Matecumbe were dead lying scattered about." 34 In his
report to President Roosevelt, Aubrey W. Williams wrote, "The
village at Islamorada was completely demolished." 35 Putrefying
corpses fouling the environment presented a public health
hazard. As a sanitation measure, some suggested that a ten-mile
stretch of Islamorada be put to the torch. For instance, Coast
Guard Lieutenant J.E. Fairbanks stated, "I recommend that entire
keys from Snake Creek to and including Lower Matecumbe be
burned." An emotional depression prevailed over the community.
John Russell, a descendent of the pioneers of the upper keys,
contemplated never returning to his old home-place. When
asked if he would rebuild his former home, Russell, postmaster
of Islamorada, replied, "I don't think so. There isn't anything
to resume life for now." Islamorada exemplified the desperate
conditions of the Great Depression: financial shambles, lack of
industry, obliterated farmland, and a shattered and demoralized
community, that federal relief programs sought to alleviate.
Building homes in Islamorada became emblematic. Hurricane
Houses embodied wider efforts to relieve a great need and rebuild
a permanent community. 36
In the days immediately following the hurricane, the Red
Cross prepared for such recovery efforts, but it was unsure how
to coordinate with federal relief agents and veterans' groups.
34. John L. Teets, American Red Cross Field Representative, September 20, 1935,
Special Field Report, submitted to Mr. Colin Herrle, Assistant Manager, Eastern
Area, Preliminary Report of Relief Activities of the American National Red
Cross, Florida Hurricane of September 2, 1935, DR-655.08, Weekly Reports
File, Box 1235.
35. Aubrey W. Williams to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, September 8, 1935, 9,
Records of the WPA, Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Central Files,
1933-1936, "New General Subject" Series, February. 1935-1936, 006 Florida
Hurricane, Entry 9, Box 7.
36. "Three Inquiries Start in Florida Deaths," New York Times, September 7, 1935,
3; "Only 11 of 79 in Florida Keys Family Alive, Patriarch of Clan Tells How Gale
Killed Kin," New York Times, September 7, 1935, 3; Knowles, Category 5, 303.
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The politics of decision-making initially hampered the disaster
recovery. The veterans advocacy groups pledged to take care of
_veterans only. The federal agencies suggested a liberal financial
response. The Red Cross offered its support to all, particularly
civilians. According to a New York Times article, the South Florida
Red Cross Safety Committee announced that it was "ready to meet
any emergencies created by the storm." 37 Initially, federal officials
in Florida made broad proclamations, promising that all agencies
would lend aid and labor would be provided for all storm recovery
construction work. The New York Times reported that Hopkins
authorized Aubrey W. Williams "to spend money without stint to
aid the injured and shocked." 38 Within a week, however, federal
officials backed away from the over-promise of complete funding
for home repair and construction. They told Red Cross officials
that FERA and the Veterans' Administration would be responsible
for relieving only veterans and their families who were working on
highway / ferry projects in the keys. As for rebuilding Islamorada,
FERA would not provide labor for private buildings. Those earlier
publicized promises had been made in haste, on dubious authority,
and without confirming the availability of funding, they explained.
The only FERA support the Red Cross and Islamorada could
expect, they said, would be FERA-funded labor for replanting lime
groves destroyed in the storm, an activity well established in the
agency through rural rehabilitation efforts in the drought stricken
American heartland. Once this reversal became clear, George
E. Myer, director of the Red Cross relief effort, announced the
disheartening news to his staff, "It will not be possible to secure
FERA labor on reconstruction of private homes."39
Even without federal commitments, the Red Cross proceeded
with substantial rebuilding plans. In a preliminary report on its
September relief activities, the charity announced it was "planning,
as a means of lessening this danger, to assist them [the people of
Islamorada] in the construction of better wind-resisting homes.
In this way, it is hoped that greater security can be enjoyed by the

37. "Red Cross Plans Relief," New York Times, September 4, 1935, 4.
38. "Defends Failure to Move Veterans," New York Times, September 6, 1935, 9.
39. George E. Myer to Red Cross Representatives, September 11, 1935, in Papers
Relating to the Construction of Red Cross Houses, on file in the Florida
Collection, Monroe County Public Library, Helen Wadley Branch, Islamorada,
Florida.
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residents of the islands and many lives may be saved in the event
of a recurrence of such an over-whelming disaster." 40 Hurricane
Houses, or some type of housing reinforced against the effects of
hurricanes appeared early in their minds as a solution to this and
future disasters. They began consulting with local builders and
architects. "What we have in mind," wrote DeWitt Smith, "is that
the houses, even though small and inexpensive, could be made
more wind resistant if kept: (I) relatively low in type; (2) firmly
anchored to the ground; (3) more structural framing spiked or
bound together as a unit; ( 4) frame soundly designed from an
engineering standpoint, using probably diagonal wood or iron
strengthening features." The homes they built followed this
initial conception. 41
Within days, the federal government reversed its policy again.
Federal relief funds would be available for fishermen in the Keys.
On September 15, Aubrey Williams wrote a Florida Congressman
to assure him that $338,000 was available in Florida for recovery
work, and he had "authorized [Conrad] Van Hyning to rehabilitate
fishermen and others to the extent permitted by Act of Congress." 42
According to internal correspondence, FERA's original cost
estimates made in early September reached $550,000 and included
rehabilitating approximately 200 families by building storm proof
buildings. Van Hyning told Williams that coordination with the
Red Cross would be the means "to carry out our program providing
for labor for their rehabilitation of civilians." 43 Federal aid, they
realized, could be shifted to Islamorada by couching it in terms of
relief for fishermen. Furthermore, the Red Cross could mediate
federal involvement. Additionally, Public Works Administration

40.

41.

42.

43.

Preliminary Report of Relief Activities of the American ational Red Cross,
Florida Hurricane of September 2, 1935, DR-655.08, Weekly Reports File, Box
1235.
DeWitt Smith to James L. Fieser, September 15, 1935 Memorandum, "Nature
and Extent of Disaster," Records of the American National Red Cross, DR655.08 Weekly Reports, Box 1235.
Aubrey Williams to RA. Green, Member of Congress, State of Florida,
September 15, 1935, Letter, Records of the WPA, Federal Emergency Relief
Administration, Central Files, 1933-1936, "New General Subject" Series, Feb.
1935-1936, 006 Florida Hurricane, Entry 9, Box 7.
Conrad Van Hyning to Aubrey Williams, September 20, 1935 Memorandum,
Records of the WPA, Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Central Files,
1933-1936, "New General Subject" Series, February 1935-1936, 006 Florida
Hurricane, Entry 9, Box 7.
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officials advanced plans for rebuilding and improving the Overseas
Highway since Key West had lost its modern connection to the
mainland, the FEC railroad. 44
In a letter dated September 19 and addressed to Red Cross
representatives, Myer stated that agreements had been reached
with Van Hyning, "whereby they will provide skilled labor at
prevailing rates throughout the state, for any reconstruction work
undertaken by the Red Cross." 45 In a verbal agreement between
Myer and Van Hyning, FERA agreed "to supply labor to the extent
available from relief rolls to the amount of $75,000." Van Hyning
stated that $75,000 would be "the maximum amount required
to complete the entire rehabilitation program which is to be
undertaken by the Red Cross." Furthermore, he reminded Myer,
"the Red Cross would supply all materials, equipment, supervision,
and any labor necessary which could not be secured from relief
rolls." 46 This spending arrangement remained in place throughout
the project. By the end of 1935, FERA, soon to be merged into the
newly created WPA, obtained responsibility for the entire project as
a work relief undertaking.
The contrast between FERA's response to the Labor Day
Hurricane and their response to a hurricane that hit Miami two
months later makes the construction of Islamorada's Hurricane
Houses that much more remarkable. On November 4, 1935, a
hurricane tore through Miami, causing considerable damage to
property and killing approximately five people. 47 As with the Labor
Day Hurricane, Van Hyning received public pressure to throw
federal relief funds into Miami's recovery effort. In the days after
the storm, FERA removed debris from streets, provided temporary
coverings for houses without roofs, and offered general "relief in
44.

45.

46.

47.

"Federal Agencies are Mobilizing Aid," New York Times, September 5, 1935,
3; "Deaths Put at 300 in Veteran Camps," New York Times, September 7,1935,
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the WPA, Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Central Files, 1933-1936,
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Entry 9, Box 7.
George E. Myer to Red Cross Representatives, September 19, 1935, and George
E. Myer to Red Cross Representatives, September 30, 1935, in Papers Relating
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the form of food and temporary shelter" alongside the Red Cross.
However, Van Hyning made a clear statement two weeks after
the storm that FERA would not undertake what it was doing in
Islamorada. He wrote, "The WPA cannot continue any further
work in the storm area as Government money cannot be used on
private property. The FERA can continue with funds already on
hand to give relief to those who still need it, following their losses
in the hurricane. The responsibility for rehabilitation in the storm
area for individuals who lost their homes has been assumed by the
Red Cross. The FERA will take no responsibility in this matter." 48
Such principles did not apply to Islamorada.
The Red Cross also ignored the contradiction between
policies in Islamorada and Miami. Dutifully, Red Cross officials in
Washington, D.C., affirmed the fact that FERA could not spend
funds on private homes in Miami but overlooked the fact that
they were spending such money in Islamorada. The Red Cross
director of disaster relief wrote to Williams to acknowledge their
understanding for Miami's recovery: "As work relief labor is
available only for public projects, it is understood that such work
relief labor cannot be assigned for reconstruction of homes. No
Federal funds are available for reconstruction of homes, purchase
of furniture, or the other items required in the rehabilitation
of families affected by the hurricane." 49 FERA's expiration and
the November storm's comparatively mild treatment of Miami
contributed to this incongruous arrangement. Second thoughts
about their partnership in rebuilding Islamorada also stinted their
plans for Miami.
Costs threatened to overwhelm the Red Cross, even with federal
assistance included. From the start in lslamorada, federal assistance
was less than reassuring. Red Cross officials expressed reservations
about teaming with the federal agencies knowing that federal
financial assistance would create a perception that the charity did
not need funds from private citizens in the recovery effort. FERA's
involvement might constrain the charity's fund-raising efforts.
48.

49.

Conrad Van Hyning, November 13, 1935, Notice, Records of the WPA, Federal
Emergency Relief Administration, Central Files, 1933-1936, "New General
Subject" Series, February 1935-1936, Entry 9, Box 7.
Robert E. Bondy, Director, Red Cross Disaster Relief, to Aubrey Williams,
November 13, 1935, Records of the WPA, Federal Emergency Relief
Administration, Central Files, 1933-1936, "New General Subject" Series,
February 1935-1936, Entry 9, Box 7.
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They also considered the possibility of losing federal assistance
again as the project proceeded. The chance that they would be
responsible for the entire cost raised budgetary concerns. DeWitt
Smith, Red Cross assistant director from national headquarters,
cautioned Myer, "We must, of course, safeguard ourselves against
the possibility of a change in the government's plans." The storm
in Miami in November 1935, for some in the Red Cross, pointed to
a changing FERA/WPA attitude. Furthermore, disasters elsewhere
had depleted their resources. Smith notified Myer that "heavy
expenditures by the National Organization on other disasters
this early during the present fiscal year resulted in the necessity
of our requesting an additional appropriation of $500,000 at the
Central Committee meeting last week." Smith reminded Myer that
Islamorada's hurricane relief effort must stay under their $185,000
original cost estimate. 50
Motivated by the storm's devastation, a sense of emergency,
and national attention, the Red Cross and FERA stuck to their
ambitious recovery project for Islamorada. They intended to repair
salvageable houses and build new houses impervious to hurricanes.
Repairs and two types of new construction, frame or masonry, drove
up the project's costs, as they determined to upgrade Islamorada's
housing stock. Departing from previous recovery efforts, the Red
Cross offered beneficiaries in Islamorada the option of building
anew in either frame or masonry. The vulnerability of human life
on the keys induced them to provide a modern improvement to
local housing: steel reinforced concrete buildings. Housing in
Islamorada would be better than before the storm, which went
beyond standard Red Cross practice. DeWitt Smith admitted such a
deviation. "Although we do not attempt in our rehabilitation work
following a disaster materially to improve the standard of living of
those who suffered in the disaster," wrote Smith, "we are in this
case undertaking to bring about an improvement in the type of
construction designed to make the homes, even though small,
more wind resistant than those which were destroyed." He justified
this approach by minimizing the required effort and cost. Smith
reported to the Red Cross chairman that "Simple features whereby
50.

DeWitt Smith to George E. Myer, September 24, 1935, William B. Lovejoy to
Howard]. Simons, November 11 , 1935, and William B. Lovejoy to Howard].
Simons, November 18, 1935, in Papers Relating to the Construction of Red
Cross Houses, on file in the Florida Collection, Monroe County Public Library,
Helen Wadley Branch, Islamorada, Florida.
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ARed Cross Hurricane House completed on Upper Matecumbe. Image courtesy of
the Florida State Archives, Tallahassee.

the houses will be securely anchored and the framing strengthened
can be incorporated, it is felt, without a large additional expenditure
of funds. In some instances poured concrete construction may be
used." Smith also reminded the chairman that FERA would provide
labor. Red Cross executives approved the project. 51
The Red Cross relied on a FERA construction engineer to design
the concrete Hurricane Houses. Mr. Pringle, a registered Florida
engineer working for FERA, drew up plans and cost estimates for
buildings of various dimensions and room configurations in late
September 1935. The Red Cross brought him into the project after
residents of Islamorada organized a petition drive demanding
construction of concrete homes. Myer reported that twenty
people signed the petition. 52 In early October, Pringle submitted
51.

52.

DeWitt Smith to George E. Myer, September 24, 1935, in Papers Relating
to the Construction of Red Cross Houses, on file in the Florida Collection,
Helen Wadley Branch Library, Islamorada, Florida; George Myer, "Report for
the Period Ending September 21, 1935," and DeWitt Smith, Assistant Director
Domestic Operations, to Admiral Cary T. Grayson, chairman of the Red Cross,
September 21, 1935, Records of the American ational Red Cross, 1935-1936,
DR 655 Florida Hurricanes, September 2-28, 1935, Cooperating Organizations
Folder, Box 1235.
George E. Myer, "Florida Hurricane Relief Operation, Report for the Period
Ending October 5, 1935," Records of the American ational Red Cross, 19351936, DR 655 Florida Hurricanes, September 2-28, 1935, Box 1235.
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a proposal that showed masonry buildings within the same price
range as frame buildings. "It appears," wrote Myer, "that it shall
_be possible to carry out our original plans of concrete and frame
construction, and still stay well within our budget." The Red Cross
happily accepted his proposals and approved a next step: a site
visit. Mr. Pringle visited the potential home sites in Islamorada to
determine the location of the buildings and then began drafting
blueprints. 53
Within two months of the Labor Day Hurricane, new
home construction and existing house repairs were underway.
Groundbreaking began in the last week of October 1935. Reports
by Red Cross officials noted the rapid pace of rebuilding, but they
encountered the chronic problem of escalating costs. The first phase
of the rebuilding project included setting damaged houses back on
their original foundations and straightening them. A month after
the storm, four homes had been repaired, and they anticipated
building 42 new homes, 26 with masonry and 16 of wood frame. 54
In the new construction, the floor plan of each residence matched
the preference of the beneficiary and the size of their family.
The Red Cross also supplied household furnishings. Materials
for the new homes arrived in bulk by barge at Islamorada and by
railroad, which terminated at Tavernier. 55 While the floor plans
were adjustable, each masonry buildings' massing and materials
reflected a standardized aesthetic resulting from the industrialized
and mechanized construction process. (See Photographs 1 and 2)
In the second phase of the project, masonry house construction
proceeded quickly and included design features related to surviving
future storms. The houses featured interior cisterns at ground
level. The reinforced concrete cisterns stored potable water and
provided, through their reinforced concrete structure, additional

53.

George E. Myer, "Florida Hurricane Relief Operation, Report for the Period
Ending October 12, 1935," Records of the American National Red Cross, 19351936, DR 655 Florida Hurricanes, September 2-28, 1935, Box 1235.
54. George E. Myer, "Florida Hurricane Relief Operation, Report for the Period
Ending October 26, 1935," in Papers Relating to the Construction of Red
Cross Houses, on file in the Florida Collection, Helen Wadley Branch Library,
Islamorada, Florida, and Records of the American National Red Cross, 19351936, DR 655 Florida Hurricanes, September 2-28, 1935, Box 1235.
55. William B. Lovejoy to Howard]. Simons, November 11 , 1935, and William B.
Lovejoy to Howard J. Simons, November 18, 1935, in Papers Relating to the
Construction of Red Cross Houses, on file in the Florida Collection, Helen
Wadley Branch Library, Islamorada, Florida.
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foundation strength. In some cases, foundation trenches extended
three to five feet into the coral rock. Builders used concrete
reinforced with steel bars throughout the homes: 12-inch-thick
reinforced concrete exterior walls, 10-inch-thick, reinforced
concrete interior partitions, and six-inch-thick, reinforced concrete
gable roofs. The fenestration consisted of operable shutters and
metal sash windows with wire safety glass in the windowpanes. The
first floor stood about five feet above ground level, not seven feet
above ground level as first proposed and requested by residents.
The number of interior rooms varied according to the size of the
owner's family. In the spring of 1936, after federal officials fully
intervened in the project, Red Cross officials estimated that the
recovery, which included building 29 masonry hurricane houses,
would be completed by June 1936. As an example of improved
housing, they claimed that the buildings were "as near wind and
water proof as could be constructed." 56
Building with reinforced concrete, defying tropical conditions,
and excavating deep foundation trenches into the coral rock
indicated the intention to construct permanent community in
Islamorada, but the extra labor resulting from an unanticipated
level of effort to excavate suitable foundations drove up costs. The
director of the Red Cross headquarters in Miami stated, "As we
get more into the picture of concrete construction, we find costs
are apparently out of relation with frame construction due to the
need for waterproof plaster inside." 57 Plumbing supplies and the
cost of cement consumed more of the budget than anticipated.
Even the price of steel rebar caught the Red Cross off guard. They
expected steel rebar to cost them between $5,000 and $6,000. The
accountants in Miami, however, reported "that the cost of this item
will be $9,953.88, thus necessitating an additional increase in the

56.

57.
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budget as requested in Mr. Myers's letter of today's date." 58 The coral
rock proved difficult to excavate, "necessitating the use of electric
drills," according to Myer. The Red Cross also expressed concern
that building masonry houses designed to withstand hurricane force
winds, high water, and loss of local water supply was setting "an
embarrassing precedent that could not be followed in other parts
of the affected territory in Florida." 59 The Red Cross regretted that
they were over-building, that their response was out of proportion to
beneficiary need and their budget. Additionally, Red Cross national
headquarters warned Myer that "we cannot undertake generally to
improve the standards of families suffering in disaster. "60 William
B. Lovejoy, a Red Cross accountant, noted "Mr. Myer has made
commitments for a considerable amount of the building material
needed in the construction of concrete houses on the Florida
Keys." Consequently, Red Cross administrators advocated frame
construction to beneficiaries as "more satisfactory" over the masonry
option. 61 Nevertheless, some Islamorada landowners would not
rescind their request for masonry homes, further embarrassing the
Red Cross. They had demonstrated their desire for concrete homes
in the petition drive, and they held the Red Cross to its promise.
The Red Cross had dealt with high expectations of community
recovery following the September 1928 hurricane that devastated
the Lake Okeechobee and West Palm Beach area. That storm
left 1,836 dead. Particularly hard hit were African-American farm
laborers in Clewiston, South Bay, Belle Glade, and Pelican Bay.
After providing immediate relief through feeding centers, the Red
Cross assisted in rebuilding homes and providing farmers with
seed, fertilizer, and fuel for farm equipment. 62
58.

William B. Lovejoy, Accountant, to Howard]. Simons, Director of Accounting,
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The Great Depression had changed the circumstances of this
disaster recovery. The decision to build concrete hurricane-proof
houses emerged from a combination of one likely local example,
local advocacy, and a modern belief in concrete 's permanence.
Islamorada's families needed such security and permanence that
modem techniques and materials promised. Reinforced concrete
provided bunker-like solidity against a hurricane's winds and
flooding, as well as a material improvement over frame construction.
A concrete industry trade journal noted that "This type of [masonry]
construction makes walls, floors , partitions, and roof one integral
unit, rather than separate parts put together." As frame buildings
floated away from their foundations in Tavernier, for example,
survivors found shelter during the storm in a concrete movie theatre
recently completed by H.S. "Mac" McKenzie. McKenzie 's theatre
served as a relief center after the hurricane. 63 By the start of the
Great Depression, reinforced concrete construction had gained a
popular reputation as scientific, industrial, and progressive. It had
appeared in industrial worker housing complexes and encouraged
stability in local workforces. Known for its fireproof qualities,
concrete installation had improved in quality and cost effectiveness
through competition, supplanting brick as the preferred choice
in masonry construction by 1924. It worked well within industrial
production constraints, especially when social upheaval called for
a fast and efficient response. Reinforced concrete homes, then,
lent an air of progress and innovation to a devastated community.
Liberty Square, a Public Works Administration Housing Division
rental housing project "for Negroes" in Miami, shared material and
design attributes with the Hurricane Houses. Liberty Square was
completed in 1937, after the Islamorada project drew to a close.
Both utilized poured concrete reinforced with steel rebar in their
structural engineering. Both featured metal sash and casement
windows. The floor plans of each project varied according to the
number of rooms to be built. Both examples also featured half-width
front porches sheltering the main entry. Both examples supported
gable roofs. While the Hurricane Houses included concrete roofing,
the Liberty Square units did not. To save costs, they had wood rafters
63. "Storm-Proof
te
Concre
H om es Bring Security to Florida Keys," Concrete
(Octobe r 1936), 8; Matthew G. Hyland a nd Megan L. Otten , Discovering
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and asbestos roofing shingles. Therefore, they were not an integral
concrete unit. Yet, they shared in the cause of providing improved
housing through concrete construction. 64
The Hurricane House emerged as a comprehensive environmental and social response to tropical storm conditions and future
disasters. They were built for the ages despite the Red Cross's
reservations. In Islamorada, a recent survey identified 24 examples
of surviving hurricane houses. Two examples were identified in a
separate survey ofTavernier. 65 Geographically, the Hurricane Houses
of the Florida Keys are located in discrete clusters on Plantation Key,
Upper Matecumbe Key, and in Tavernier. This distribution indicates
settlement patterns at the time of the hurricane and the efforts of
local families to rebuild their community with federal funds in a
mode of permanent architecture right after the storm. In only a few
locations do they occur in clusters that clearly reveal the industrial
rhythm of standardization in their massing.
The Red Cross's lead in their partnership with the federal
government lasted only two months. Escalating construction costs
drove the Red Cross out of the project, but the community rebuilding
effort continued. By mid-November 1935, FERA assumed all control
of the relief operation after the Red Cross had purchased most of
the required materials. Myer reported, "The FERA has taken over, in
entirety, the reconstruction and repair work on this operation. They
are providing equipment in addition to labor for the construction
work." 66 With the Red Cross providing a public face for it, this New
Deal housing intervention moved FERA farther across the threshold
into the private construction business, transforming federal
government from unemployed work relief provider and mortgage
64.

65.

66.
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guarantor to homebuilder. Active federal participation in private
building enterprises had become a reality in Islamorada.
The Red Cross expressed relief when FERA assigned William
Green to the Islamorada building project. A Red Cross official
acknowledged that completing their ambitious building program
on their own with "ordinary labor, plus the necessary cost of
equipment, would have made the cost of the project prohibitive." 67
Although the Red Cross withdrew from the project, it continued
to monitor the progress of construction, and the appellation "Red
Cross House" has stuck with the buildings. By the completion
of the project, FERA had been subsumed into the WPA, which
Congress created through the Emergency Relief Act in May 1935
to end direct relief and provide aid only for "employables" through
public works projects. Hurricane House construction, which began
as an emergency relief project, met the WPA's objectives to provide
employment, rather than the dole, for skilled workers without jobs.
Rarely though, are they called WPA or FERA houses. Red Cross
House connotes charity and sympathy, underscoring the social
action and communal response to the disaster.
The workers building the Hurricane Houses received wages
less than the rates paid by private contractors at the time. The Red
Cross's Myer reported that the workmen, mainly African-American
males, were paid "lower than ordinary labor rates, due to the fact
that individuals employed by the FERA are not drawing prevailing
labor wages, but are being paid a higher rate than individuals
engaged on WPA projects." Work on Hurricane Houses paid less
than the private sector but more than the WPA. However, FERA
provided housing for some of the men. They established a work
camp, which was supervised by William Green and Stanley Wilson,
Assistant Director of FERA's Special Projects. The Red Cross also
called on this work force, stationed at Snake Creek, to restore lime
groves by planting 238 lime trees. 68
67.
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African-American workers tying steel reinforcement bars in preparation for a load
of poured concrete. Image courtesy of the Florida State Archives, Tallahassee.

In addition to the attention Hurricane Houses received
in a trade journal, the Red Cross publicized their efforts in the
Keys. Red Cross involvement blunted criticism of federal activism
in this realm of private enterprise and private property. As a
government agency, FERA and later the WPA, were reluctant to
illustrate and proclaim the Hurricane Houses, which could have
aided administration critics prowling during an election year for
evidence that the federal government had overstepped a boundary
by providing outlays for direct relief to homeowners. In fact, federal
relief officials sought out the Red Cross to cloak their clean-up work
on private property in Miami after a November 1935 hurricane.
Talking to his supervisor in Washington, Van Hyning said that his
office could "work with the Red Cross on labor" and "do it without
any publicity." 69 FERA followed this strategy in the Islamorada
project, letting the Red Cross celebrate the houses. The Red Cross
did so in Hurricanes 1935, a small pamphlet containing an essay
69. Telephone conversation, Conrad Van Hyning in Jacksonville to Aubrey
Williams, November 13, 1935, Records of the WPA, Federal Emergency Relief
Administration, Central Files, 1933-1936. "New General Subject" Series,
February 1935-1936, 006 Florida Hurricane, Entry 9, Box 7.
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titled "Storm-Proofing the Keys." Here, the Red Cross trumpeted
a victory of technology over nature: "concrete was the solution,"
they claimed. The masonry buildings projected permanence and
prosperity through the techniques of industrialization. 70
Although they did not win acclaim in federal publications or a
notice in a Hollywood film script or a mention in a Hemingway essay,
Hurricane Houses, both frame and masonry types, are a monument
in their own right. They preserved the community of Islamorada.
For their owners, they represented architecture of reassurance:
restoration of communal stability that the storm at first seemed to
have taken away. Contrary to John Russell's despair after the storm,
natives of the Keys, the Red Cross argued, remained dedicated to
living in their unique environment. "They would not," stated a Red
Cross writer, "entertain the idea ofleaving fertile fishing waters and
their lime groves for more uncertain and competitive vocations on
the mainland." The Red Cross crafted a nostalgic, back-to-the-land
aura for the project. Islamorada, a place where the nation thought
that the entire population had been destroyed, had recovered
through a comprehensive federal building program. Aside from
agriculture, tourism and recreation, most notably sport fishing,
provided a livelihood for many residents. In these new houses,
Conchs [natives of the Keys], according to the Red Cross, would be
anchored to their familiar shores in homes "reinforced with rods of
steel and the best type of wind-resistance materials so that residents
might have some feeling of security." Likewise, the journal Concrete
declared that "these houses are as rigid as though hewn from solid
rock," adding that the homes would provide "staunch protection
against the worst that nature can do." The Red Cross acknowledged
that there would be more hurricanes in the future, but they had
provided greater security: "Some of the teeth, at least, have been
taken out of the hurricanes." 71
After their completion, the houses and the hurricane
in particular, remained worthy of attention for Roosevelt's
70.
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speechwriters and on the President's mind. The President's second
inaugural address, which reviewed the New Deal's first four years,
_employed a hurricane metaphor to note the New Deal's success,
thereby alluding to Islamorada's tragedy and relying on its
prominence in American memory for rhetorical impact. During
the hard economic times, individuals, Roosevelt insisted, needed
government assistance when facing contemporary economic
problems compounded by natural disaster. Though not directly
mentioned, the recovery of Islamorada exemplified New Deal
objectives achieved. "We refused to leave the problems of our
common welfare to be solved by the winds of chance and the
hurricanes of disaster," he said. 72
Today, examples of Hurricane Houses still stand in the Upper
Florida Keys landscape. Although frame Hurricane Houses were
part of the project, fewer examples have survived compared to the
masonry versions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of these
federally funded houses have survived the insults of subsequent
hurricanes, in particular Hurricane Donna, to tell how community,
humanitarian organization, and government responded to a
housing crisis created by an act of nature. The federal government
forestalled disenchantment with life and fostered community
identity in Islamorada. Over time, housing in the Florida keys
designed to withstand storms and high winds evolved, developing
elevated pier foundations rather than the continuous poured
concrete foundation, as cisterns became obsolete. Mains connected
to the mainland guaranteed a continuous water supply. 73 Adequate
supplies of potable water were crucial after the storms moved
out of the region. Later, evacuation to the mainland became the
preferred alternative for surviving hurricanes.
True, Hurricane Houses show the federal government in the
Great Depression infringing on private business enterprises at
an unprecedented level. Islamorada, southern Florida, and by
extension the nation at large, however, sanctioned such federal
home-building as necessary social action for the benefit of the
community. The storm, the deaths, and the economic hard times
across the nation justified the concerted action that built these
houses. Their architectural story expresses the federal government's
72.
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intention to bolster national pride and domestic security in the
midst of economic hardship. In the Upper Florida Keys, the federal
government built permanent, well-constructed private homes for
storm victims on their property, thus demonstrating remarkable
federal efforts to restore a community devastated by a hurricane
and crippled by economic depression. Although Hurricane Houses
may be less visible on the Islamorada landscape than the Hurricane
Memorial adjacent to the Overseas Highway, they are, nonetheless,
historical markers exemplifying the reach, broader than previously
thought, and legacy of the New Deal.
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